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VALUING CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS I:
NO COUNTERPARTY DEFAULT RISK
Abstract
This paper provides a methodology for valuing credit default swaps when the payoff
is contingent on default by a single reference entity and there is no counterparty default
risk. The paper tests the sensitivity of credit default swap valuations to assumptions about
the expected recovery rate. It also tests whether approximate no-arbitrage arguments give
accurate valuations and provides an example of the application of the methodology to real
data. In a companion paper entitled Valuing Credit Default Swaps II: Modeling Default
Correlation, the analysis is extended to cover situations where the payoff is contingent
on default by multiple reference entities and situations where there is counterparty default
risk.
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Credit default swaps have become increasingly popular in recent years. Their purpose
is to allow credit risks to be traded and managed in much the same way as market risks. In
1998, trading in credit default swaps was facilitated by standard documentation produced
by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association.
A credit default swap (CDS) is a contract that provides insurance against the risk of
a default by particular company. The company is known as the reference entity and a
default by the company is known as a credit event. The buyer of the insurance obtains
the right to sell a particular bond issued by the company for its par value when a credit
event occurs. The bond is known as the reference obligation and the total par value of
the bond that can be sold is known as the swap’s notional principal.
The buyer of the CDS makes periodic payments to the seller until the end of the life
of the CDS or until a credit event occurs. A credit event usually requires a final accrual
payment by the buyer. The swap is then settled by either physical delivery or in cash.
If the terms of the swap require physical delivery, the swap buyer delivers the bonds to
the seller in exchange for their par value. When there is cash settlement, the calculation
agent polls dealers to determine the mid-market price, Q, of the reference obligation some
specified number of days after the credit event. The cash settlement is then (100 − Q)%
of the notional principal.
An example may help to illustrate how a typical deal is structured. Suppose that
two parties enter into a five-year credit default swap on March 1, 2000. Assume that the
notional principal is $100 million and the buyer agrees to pay 90 basis points annually for
protection against default by the reference entity. If the reference entity does not default
(that is, there is no credit event), the buyer receives no payoff and pays $900,000 on March 1
of each of the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. If there is a credit event a substantial
payoff is likely. Suppose that the buyer notifies the seller of a credit event on September
1, 2003 (half way through the fourth year). If the contract specifies physical settlement,
the buyer has the right to sell $100 million par value of the reference obligation for $100
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million. If the contract requires cash settlement, the calculation agent would poll dealers
to determine the mid-market value of the reference obligation a predesignated number of
days after the credit event. If the value of the reference obligation proved to be $35 per
$100 of par value, the cash payoff would be $65 million. In the case of either physical
or cash settlement, the buyer would be required to pay to the seller the amount of the
annual payment accrued between March 1, 2003 and September 1, 2003 (approximately
$450,000), but no further payments would be required.
There are a number of variations on the standard credit default swap. In a binary
credit default swap, the payoff in the event of a default is a specific dollar amount. In a
basket credit default swap, a group of reference entities are specified and there is a payoff
when the first of these reference entities defaults. In a contingent credit default swap, the
payoff requires both a credit event and an additional trigger. The additional trigger might
be a credit event with respect to another reference entity or a specified movement in some
market variable. In a dynamic credit default swap, the notional amount determining the
payoff is linked to the mark-to-market value of a portfolio of swaps.
In this paper we explain how a plain vanilla and binary credit default swap can be val-
ued assuming no counterparty default risk. Like most other approaches, ours assumes that
default probabilities, interest rates, and recovery rates are independent. Unfortunately,
it does not seem to be possible to relax these assumptions without a considerably more
complex model. However, we are able to reach some general conclusions about the impact
of the assumptions on CDS valuations.
We test the sensitivity of our valuations to assumptions about the amount claimed
in the event of a default and the expected recovery rate. We also test whether approxi-
mate no-arbitrage arguments give accurate valuations. In a later paper, Hull and White
(2000), we will explain how the analysis can be extended to cover situations where the
payoff is contingent on default by multiple reference entities and situations where there is
counterparty default risk.
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1. Estimation of Default Probabilities
The valuation of a credit default swap requires estimates of the risk-neutral probability
that the reference entity will default at different future times. The prices of bonds issued
by the reference entity provide the main source of data for the estimation. If we assume
that the only reason a corporate bond sells for less than a similar Treasury bond is the
possibility of default, it follows that:
Value of Treasury Bond−Value of Corporate Bond = Present Value of Cost of Defaults
By using this relationship to calculate the present value of the cost of defaults on a range of
different bonds issued by the reference entity, and making an assumption about recovery
rates, we can estimate the probability of the corporation defaulting at different future
times.1 If the reference entity has issued relatively few actively traded bonds, we can use
bonds issued by another corporation that is considered to have the same risk of default as
the reference entity. This is likely to be a corporation whose bonds have the same credit
rating as those of the reference entity—and ideally a corporation in the same industry as
the reference entity.
We start with a simple example. Suppose that a five-year zero-coupon Treasury bond
with a face value of 100 yields 5% and a similar five-year zero-coupon bond issued by a
corporation yields 5.5%. (Both rates are expressed with continuous compounding.) The
value of the Treasury bond is 100e−0.05×5 or 77.8801 and the value of the corporate bond
is 100e−0.055×5 = 75.9572. The present value of the cost of defaults is, therefore
77.8801− 75.9572 = 1.9229
Define the risk-neutral probability of default during the five-year life of the bond as
p. If we make the simplifying assumption that there are no recoveries in the event of a
1 We assume that Treasury rates are the benchmark zero-default-risk rates. Some an-
alysts argue that, because of the tax treatment of Treasury bonds in the United States
and other issues, it may be more appropriate to use Agency rates or LIBOR rates as the
benchmark. Our analysis can be adjusted to do this.
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default, the impact of a default is to create a loss of 100 at the end of the five years. The
expected loss from defaults in a risk-neutral world is, therefore, 100p and the present value
of the expected loss is
100pe−0.05×5
It follows that:
100pe−0.05×5 = 1.9229
so that p = 0.0247 or 2.47%.
There are two reasons why the calculations for extracting default probabilities from
bond prices are, in practice, usually more complicated than this. First, the recovery rate
is usually non-zero. Second, most corporate bonds are not zero-coupon bonds.
When the recovery rate is non-zero, it is necessary to make an assumption about the
claim made by bondholders in the event of default. Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and Hull
and White (1995) assume that the claim equals the no-default of the bond. Duffie and
Singleton (1997) assume that the claim is equal to the value of the bond immediately prior
to default. As pointed out by J.P. Morgan (1999) and Jarrow and Turnbull (2000), these
assumptions do not correspond to the way bankruptcy laws work in most countries. The
best assumption is that the claim made in the event of a default equals the face value of
the bond plus accrued interest.
As mentioned earlier, the payoff from a CDS in the event of a default at time t is
usually the face value of the reference obligation minus its market value just after time t.
Using the best claim amount assumption just mentioned, the market value of the reference
obligation just after default is the recovery rate times the sum of its face value and accrued
interest. This means that the payoff from a typical CDS is
L−RL[1 +A(t)] = L[1−R−A(t)] (1)
where L is the notional principal, R is the recovery rate, and A(t) is the accrued interest
on the reference obligation at time t as a percent of its face value.
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A General Analysis Assuming Defaults at Discrete Times
We now present a general analysis that can be used in conjunction with alternative
assumptions about the claim amount. We assume that we have chosen a set of N bonds
that are either issued by the reference entity or issued by another corporation that is
considered to have the same risk of default as the reference entity.2 We assume that
defaults can happen on any of the bond maturity dates. Later we generalize the analysis
to allow defaults to occur on any date. Suppose that the maturity of the ith bond is ti
with t1 < t2 < t3... < tN . Define:
Bj : Price of the jth bond today
Gj : Price of the jth bond today if there were no probability of default (that is, the
price of a Treasury bond promising the same cash flows as the jth bond).
Fj(t): Forward price of the jth bond for a forward contract maturing at time t assuming
the bond is default-free (t < tj)
v(t): Present value of $1 received at time t with certainty
Cj(t): Claim made by holders of the jth bond if there is a default at time t (t < tj)
Rj(t): Recovery rate for holders of the jth bond in the event of a default at time t
(t < tj)
αij : Present value of the loss, relative to the value the bond would have if there were
no possibility of default, from a default on the jth bond at time ti
pi: The risk-neutral probability of default at time ti
For ease of exposition, we first assume that interest rates are deterministic and that both
recovery rates and claim amounts are known with certainty. We then explain how these
assumptions can be relaxed.
Because interest rates are deterministic, the price at time t of the no-default value of
2 By the same risk of default we mean that the probability of default in any future time
interval, as seen today, is the same.
7
the jth bond is Fj(t). If there is a default at time t, the bondholder makes a recovery at
rate Rj(t) on a claim of Cj(t). It follows that
αij = v(ti)[Fj(ti)−Rj(ti)Cj(ti)] (2)
There is a probability, pi of the loss αij being incurred. The total present value of the
losses on the jth bond is, therefore, given by:
Gj −Bj =
j∑
i=1
piαij (3)
This equation allows the p’s to be determined inductively:
pj =
Gj −Bj −
∑j−1
i=1 piαij
αjj
(4)
Recovery Rate Assumption
These results have been produced on the assumption that interest rates are constant,
recovery rates are known, and claim amounts are known. In what follows we will consider
two assumptions about the claim amount. The first is that it equals the no-default value
of the bond at the time of the default; the second is that it equals the face value plus
accrued interest at the time of the default. It can be shown that, for either of these two
assumptions, if a) default events, b) Treasury interest rates, and c) recovery rates are
mutually independent, equations (2) and (3) are still true for stochastic interest rates,
uncertain recovery rates, and uncertain default probabilities providing the recovery rate is
set equal to its expected value in a risk-neutral world.
It is probably reasonable to assume that there is no systematic risk in recovery rates
so that expected recovery rates observed in the real world are also expected recovery rates
in the risk-neutral world. This allows the expected recovery rate to be estimated from
historical data. Table 1 shows some estimates produced recently by Moody’s.3 As might
3 Moody’s calculates the recovery rate as the market value of the bond one month after
default as a percent of its par value. The relevant recovery rate for our analysis is slightly
lower. It is the market value of the bond one month after default as a percent of its par
value plus accrued interest at the time of default.
8
be expected, the mean recovery rate is heavily dependent on the seniority of the bond.
As mentioned earlier, the N bonds used in the analysis are issued either by the ref-
erence entity or by another company that is considered to have the same risk of default
as the reference entity. This means that the pi should be the same for all bonds. The
recovery rates can in theory vary according to the bond and the default time. We will
assume, for ease of exposition, that all the bonds have the same seniority in the event of
default by the reference obligation and that the expected recovery rate is independent of
time. The expected value of Rj(t) is then independent of both j and t. We will denote
this expected value by Rˆ.
Extension to Situation Where Defaults can Happen at any Time
The analysis used to derive equation (4) assumes that default can take place only on
bond maturity dates. We now extend it to allow defaults at any time. Define q(t)∆t as
the probability of default between times t and t + ∆t as seen at time zero. The variable
q(t) is not the same as the hazard (default intensity) rate. The hazard rate, h(t), is defined
so that h(t)∆t is the probability of default between times t and t + ∆t as seen at time t
assuming no default between time zero and time t. The variables q(t) and h(t) are related
by
q(t) = h(t)e
−
∫ t
0
h(τ)dτ
Many credit risk models such as Duffie and Singleton (1997), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995),
and Lando (1998) are formulated in terms of h(t). However, we find it convenient to
express our results in terms of q(t) rather than h(t). We will refer to q(t) as the default
probability density.
We assume that q(t) is constant and equal to qi for ti−1 < t < ti.4. Setting
βij =
∫ ti
ti−1
v(t)[Fj(t)− RˆCj(t)]dt (5)
4 This is similar to the assumption, made in Duffie (1999), that h(t) is constant for
ti−1 < t < ti. When h(t) is constant, q(t) is monotonic declining.
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a similar analysis to that used in deriving equation (4) gives:
qj =
Gj −Bj −
∑j−1
i=1 qiβij
βjj
(6)
The parameters βij can be estimated using standard procedures, such as Simpson’s rule,
for evaluating a definite integral.
Claim Amounts and Value Additivity
We now present a numerical example and investigate the impact of different assump-
tions about the claim amount. As mentioned earlier, Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and Hull
and White (1995) assume that, in the event of a default, the bondholder claims the no-
default value of the bond. This is an attractive assumption. It implies that Cj(t) = Fj(t).
The parameter, βij , is then proportional to 1 − Rˆ so that equation (6) can be used to
estimate qi(1− Rˆ) directly from observable market variables. Furthermore, an analysis of
equation (6) shows that, in this case, the value of the coupon-bearing bond Bj is the sum
of the values of the underlying zero-coupon bonds. This property is referred to as value
additivity. It implies that it is theoretically correct to calculate zero curves for different
rating categories (AAA, AA, A, BBB, etc) from actively traded bonds and use them for
pricing less actively traded bonds.
As mentioned earlier, the best assumption is that Cj(t) equals the face value of bond
j plus accrued interest at time t. As pointed out by Jarrow and Turnbull (2000), value
additivity does not apply when this assumption is made (except in the special case where
the recovery rate is zero). This means that there is no zero-coupon yield curve that can
be used to price corporate bonds exactly for a given set of assumptions about default
probabilities and expected recovery rates.
Table 2 provides hypothetical data on six bonds issued by a reference entity. The
bonds have maturities ranging from one to ten years and the spreads of their yields over
Treasury yields are typical of those for BBB-rated bonds. The coupons are assumed to
be paid semiannually, the Treasury zero curve is assumed to be flat at 5% (semiannually
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compounded), and the expected recovery rate is assumed to be 30%. Table 3 calculates the
default probability densities for the two alternative assumptions about the claim amount.
It can be seen that the two assumptions give similar results. This is usually the case. For
the default probability densities to be markedly different, it would be necessary for the
coupons on the bonds to be either very much greater or very much less than the risk-free
rate.5
Expected Recovery Rates and Bond Yields
Default probability densities must be greater than zero. From equation (6) this means
that
Bj ≤ Gj −
j−1∑
i=1
qiβij (7)
It is also true that the cumulative probability of default must be less than 1. This means
that
j∑
i=1
qi(ti − ti−1) ≤ 1
or
qj(tj − tj−1) ≤ 1−
j−1∑
i=1
qi(ti − ti−1)
so that from equation (6)
Bj ≥ Gj −
j−1∑
i=1
qiβij − βjj
tj − tj−1
[
1−
j−1∑
i=1
qi(ti − ti−1)
]
(8)
Equations (7) and (8) impose both an upper and lower bound on the yield on the
bond maturing at time tj once expected recovery rates and the yields on bonds maturing
at earlier times have been specified. In the example in Table 2, when the expected recovery
rate is 30%, a 20-year bond with a coupon of 7% must have a yield between 6.50% and
9.57% when the claim amount equals the face value plus accrued interest.
5 In emerging markets the yields on bonds can be several hundred or even several
thousand percent. However, the coupons on these bonds are usually relatively low.
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In general, we can use equations (7) and (8) to test whether a set of bond yields
are consistent with the recovery rate assumption. Inconsistencies indicate that either the
expected recovery rate assumption is wrong or bonds are mispriced.
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2. The Valuation
We now move on to consider the valuation of a plain vanilla credit default swap with a
$1 notional principal. We assume that default events, Treasury interest rates, and recovery
rates are mutually independent. We also assume that the claim in the event of default is
the face value plus accrued interest. Define
T : Life of credit default swap
q(t): Risk-neutral default probability density at time t
Rˆ: Expected recovery rate on the reference obligation in a risk-neutral world. As indicated
in the previous section, this is assumed to be independent of the time of the default
and the same as the recovery rate on the bonds used to calculate q(t).
u(t): Present value of payments at the rate of $1 per year on payment dates between time
zero and time t
e(t): Present value of an accrual payment at time t equal to t− t∗ where t∗ is the payment
date immediately preceding time t.
v(t): Present value of $1 received at time t
w: Total payments per year made by credit default swap buyer
s: Value of w that causes the credit default swap to have a value of zero
pi: The risk-neutral probability of no credit event during the life of the swap
A(t): Accrued interest on the reference obligation at time t as a percent of face value
The value of pi is one minus the probability that a credit event will occur by time T .
It can be calculated from q(t):
pi = 1−
∫ T
0
q(t) dt
The payments last until a credit event or until time T , whichever is sooner. If a default
occurs at time t (t < T ), the present value of the payments is w[u(t) + e(t)]. If there is no
default prior to time T , the present value of the payments is wu(T ). The expected present
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value of the payments is, therefore:
w
∫ T
0
q(t)[u(t) + e(t)] dt+ wpiu(T )
Given our assumption about the claim amount, equation (1) shows that the risk-neutral
expected payoff from the CDS is
1− [1 +A(t)]Rˆ = 1− Rˆ−A(t)Rˆ
The present value of the expected payoff from the CDS is∫ T
0
[1− Rˆ−A(t)Rˆ]q(t)v(t) dt
and the value of the credit default swap to the buyer is the present value of the expected
payoff minus the present value of the payments made by the buyer or∫ T
0
[1− Rˆ−A(t)Rˆ]q(t)v(t) dt− w
∫ T
0
q(t)[u(t) + e(t)] dt− piwu(T )
The CDS spread, s, is the value of w that makes this expression zero:
s =
∫ T
0 [1− Rˆ−A(t)Rˆ]q(t)v(t) dt∫ T
0 q(t)[u(t) + e(t)] dt+ piu(T )
(9)
The variable s is referred to as the credit default swap spread or CDS spread. It is
the total of the payments per year, as a percent of the notional principal, for a newly issued
credit default swap. Consider the data in Table 2 and suppose that the reference obligation
is a five-year bond paying a semiannual coupon of 10% per annum with Rˆ = 0.3. Equation
(9) gives the value of s for a five-year credit default swap with semiannual payments to be
1.944%. This is an annualized spread because of the way w is defined. Payments equal to
0.972% of the CDS notional principal would be required every six months.
Approximate No-Arbitrage Arguments
There is an approximate no-arbitrage argument that can be used to understand the
determinants of s. If an investor forms a portfolio of a T -year par yield bond issued by
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the reference entity and the credit default swap, the investor has eliminated most of the
risks associated with default on the bond. If y is the yield to maturity on the bond, the
investor’s net annual return is (at least, approximately) y − s. In the absence of arbitrage
opportunities this should be (again, approximately) the T -year Treasury par yield, which
we will denote by x. If y − s is significantly higher than x, an arbitrageur will find it
profitable to buy a T -year par yield bond issued by the reference entity, buy the credit
default swap, and short a T -year par yield Treasury bond. If y − s is significantly less
than x, an arbitrageur will find it profitable to short a T -year par yield bond issued by the
reference entity, sell the credit default swap, and buy a T -year Treasury par yield bond.
The argument just given suggests that s should equal y−x. However, a close analysis
of it shows that the arbitrage is less than perfect. Define:
s∗ : y − x
L: CDS notional principal
A∗(t): The accrued interest as a percent of the face value at time t on a T -year par
yield bond that is issued at time zero by the reference entity with the same
payment dates as the swap. We will refer to this bond as the underlying par
yield corporate bond.
R: Realized recovery rate when a default happens
We first consider the situation where the Treasury curve is flat and interest rates are
constant. In this case the CDS spread is exactly s∗ for a credit default swap where the
payoff in the event of a credit event at time t is L[1 +A∗(t)](1−R). To see this, consider
the position of an investor who buys both the credit default swap and an amount of the
underlying corporate par yield bond with a face value of L when the spread is s∗. Using
the notation above, s∗ is the corporate par yield, y, minus the Treasury rate, x. The
investor receives exactly the same cash flows as those from a Treasury par yield bond until
either time T or a credit event, whichever is earlier. If a credit event occurs at time t
(0 < t < T ), the investor has to make an accrual payment at time t so that the net payoff
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from the CDS is
L[1 +A∗(t)](1−R)− L(y − x)(t− t∗)
where as before t∗ is the payment date immediately prior to time t. Because A∗(t) =
y(t− t∗), this reduces to
L[1 + x(t− t∗)]− LR[1 +A∗(t)]
The corporate bond holding is worth LR[1 +A∗(t)] so that the net value of the holding is
L[1 + x(t − t∗)]. This is exactly what is required to buy a par yield Treasury bond with
a face value of L at time t. It follows that in all circumstances, the investor’s portfolio
exactly replicates the cash flows from the par yield Treasury bond showing that s∗ must
be the correct CDS spread. A spread greater than or less than s∗ would give rise to an
arbitrage opportunity.
We will refer to a CDS that provides a payoff of [1 + A∗(t)](1 − R) as an idealized
credit default swap. Our analysis shows that the spread on such a CDS is exactly s∗.
In practice, the payoff from a credit default swap is usually 1 − R − A(t)R rather than
[1 +A∗(t)](1−R). This leads to s∗ overestimating the true spread, s.
Continuing for a moment with the assumption that the Treasury curve is flat and
interest rates are constant, we can correct for the difference between the payoff on the
idealized CDS and the actual CDS. An analysis similar to that leading up to equation (9)
shows that the spread for an idealized credit default swap is given by
s∗ =
(1− Rˆ) ∫ T0 [1 +A∗(t)]q(t)v(t) dt∫ T
0 q(t)[u(t) + e(t)] dt+ piu(T )
An approximation to this is
s∗ =
(1− Rˆ)(1 + a∗) ∫ T0 q(t)v(t) dt∫ T
0 q(t)[u(t) + e(t)] dt+ piu(T )
(10)
where a∗ is the average value of A∗(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Similarly, from equation (9), an
approximation to the actual CDS spread is
s =
(1− Rˆ− aRˆ) ∫ T0 q(t)v(t) dt∫ T
0 q(t)[u(t) + e(t)] dt+ piu(T )
(11)
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where a is the average value of A(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
From equations (9) and (10)
s =
s∗(1− Rˆ− aRˆ)
(1− Rˆ)(1 + a∗) (12)
As an illustration of equation (12), consider the data in Table 2 and assume, as before,
that the coupon on the reference obligation is 10%. (We will refer to this as Case A; see
Table 4.) The five-year par yield for bonds issued by the reference entity is 7%. The
five-year Treasury par yield is 5%. It follows that, for a five-year credit default swap with
semiannual payments, s∗ is 2.00%. The coupon paid every six months on a par yield bond
issued by the reference entity is 3.5 per 100 of principal so that a∗ = 0.0175. Also a = 0.025
and Rˆ = 0.3 so that equation (12) gives s = 1.945%. This is very close to the 1.944%
estimate reported earlier from using equation (9).
Equation (12) assumes a flat Treasury yield curve and constant interest rates. Stochas-
tic interest rates make the no-arbitrage argument for the idealized CDS less than perfect,
but do not affect valuations given our assumption that interest rates, default probabilities,
and recovery rates are independent. However, the no-arbitrage argument for the idealized
CDS swap requires a flat yield curve so that a par yield Treasury bond is always worth its
face value plus accrued interest at the time of a default. An upward sloping yield curve
will lead to the par yield Treasury bond being worth less than the face value plus accrued
interest on average. As a result s∗ underestimates the spread for the idealized CDS. Simi-
larly a downward sloping yield curve leads to s∗ overestimating the spread on the idealized
CDS.
As pointed out by Duffie (1999), we can deal with non-flat Treasury curves by con-
sidering par yield floating-rate bonds rather than par yield fixed-rate bonds. Define a
Treasury par floater as a floating-rate bond where the interest rate is reset on each pay-
ment date of the credit default swap, and a par floater issued by the reference entity as
a similar floating-rate bond that promises a prespecified spread above the Treasury par
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floater for the life of the credit default swap. If the payoff from the credit default swap is
[1 + A∗(t)](1 − R) where A∗(t) is here defined as the accrual on the par floater issued by
the reference entity, the arbitrage arguments are watertight and the CDS spread should
exactly equal the spread of the reference entity floater over the Treasury floater.
In practice we rarely get the opportunity to observe the spreads on corporate par
yield floaters. Credit default swaps must be evaluated from the yields on fixed rate bonds
issued by the reference entity. The difference between the spread on par yield floaters and
par yield fixed rate instruments is very small for flat term structures, but noticeable for
non-flat term structures. As an extreme test of the effect of a non-flat term structure we
changed the flat Treasury curve in Case A to a Treasury curve where the 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-,
and 5-year par yields were 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5%, respectively. (We will refer to this
as Case B; see Table 4.) Everything else, including the spreads between par yields on
Treasuries and yields on bonds issued by the reference entity was maintained as in Case
A. As a result, the five-year par yield for bonds issued by the reference was still 7% and
s∗ was still 2.00%. However, the value of s given by equation (9) increased from 1.944%
to 2.071%.
We also rarely get the chance to observe corporate bonds that are selling for exactly
their par value. Assuming that the yield on a non-par-yield bond is the same as the yield
on a par yield bond introduces some error. We tested this by changing the coupons on
all bonds used to calculate default probabilities in Case A from 7% to 4% while keeping
everything else (including the yield on the bonds) the same as in Case A. (We will refer
to this as Case C; see Table 4.) The value of s increased from 1.944 to 1.990. This change
results entirely from the correct five year par yield being 7.048% rather than 7%.6 For less
creditworthy reference entities, the error from basing calculations on non-par-yield bonds
6 Equation (12) provides an accurate estimate of s when the correct par yield is used
so that s∗ = 2.048, a∗ = 0.01762, a = 0.025 and Rˆ = 0.3.
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can be much greater. Suppose Case A is changed so that the recovery rate is zero and the 1-,
2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-year yields on bonds issued by the reference entity are 10%, 20% 30%, 40%
and 50%, respectively. (We will refer to this as Case D; see Table 4.) Assuming that the par
yield is 50% and using equation (12) leads to an estimate of 40% for the value of s (s∗ = 45,
a∗ = 0.125, a = 0.025, and Rˆ = 0). The correct value of s given by equation (9) is 29.98%.
This difference largely results from the correct par yield being about 38% rather than 50%.
Impact of Expected Recovery Rate on Pricing
The one parameter necessary for valuing a credit default swap that cannot be observed
directly in the market is the expected recovery rate. We assume that the same recovery
rate is used for estimating the default probability densities and for calculating the payoff.
As it happens there is an offset. As the expected recovery rate increases, estimates of the
probability of default increase and payoffs decrease. The overall impact of the recovery
rate assumption on the value of a credit default swap is generally fairly small when the
expected recovery rate is in the 0% to 50% range.
This is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the dependence of the five-year CDS spread
on the expected recovery rate in Cases A, B, and C considered above.7 In Case A the yield
curve is flat and the par yield spread is 2%. The spread for an idealized CDS, s∗, is always
exactly 2%. The actual CDS spread is less than 2% and is a decreasing function of the
expected recovery rate. When we move from Case A to the upward sloping yield curve in
Case B, the CDS spread increases. The higher the expected recovery rate, the greater the
impact of an upward sloping yield curve on the CDS spread. In Case C the coupon on
the five year bond is less than the five-year par yield. This leads to the par yield being an
increasing function of the expected recovery rate. As a result the CDS spread is also an
increasing function of the expected recovery rate.
7 We did not consider Case D because equations (5) and (8) imply that the expected
recovery rate must be very low.
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Binary Credit Default Swaps
A binary credit default swap is structured similarly to a regular credit default swap
except that the payoff is a fixed dollar amount. A similar analysis to that given earlier
shows that the value a binary CDS spread that provides a payoff of $1 in the event of a
default is ∫ T
0 q(t)v(t) dt∫ T
0 q(t)[u(t) + e(t)] dt+ piu(T )
This is quite heavily dependent on the expected recovery rate, as illustrated by Figure 2.
The Independence Assumptions
The valuation approaches we have presented are based on the assumption that inter-
est rates, default probabilities, and recovery rates are independent. These assumptions are
unlikely to be perfectly true in practice. For example, it can be argued that high interest
rates cause companies to experience financial difficulties and, as a result, default probabil-
ities increase. Such a positive relation between interest rates and default probabilities has
two effects. First, high default probabilities tend to be associated with high discount rates
for the payoffs. This reduces the CDS spread. Second high default probabilities tend to
be associated with relatively low market values for bonds issued by the reference entity.
This increases the CDS spread (because it increases the value of the buyer’s right to sell
the reference bond for its face value). It is reassuring that these effects act in opposite
directions so there is a partial offset. Note that the relevant correlation for the first effect
is between default rates at time t and the average short term interest rates between time
zero and time t; the relevant correlation for the second effect is between interest rates at
time t and medium to long rates at time t. As far as the second effect is concerned, the
correlation is less than might be supposed because there are often significant time lags
between the occurrence of high interest rates and the resultant defaults.8
8 For example, high interest rates in the early 1980s caused problems in many sectors
of the U.S. economy, but many of the resulting defaults occurred a few years later—when
rates were much lower.
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Moody’s Investor’s Service (2000) provides statistics which suggest that the correla-
tions are small and provides a reasonable comfort level for the independence assumptions.
Default rates are only weakly correlated with macroeconomic variables. For example, the
correlation between the US Industrial Production Index and the All Corporate Default
Rate is reported to be -0.14. Moody’s does provide some evidence that recovery rates are
positively correlated with general economic conditions. This suggests that recovery rates
may be negatively related to default probabilities—a phenomenon that increases CDS
spreads. However, again we can reasonably hypothesize that the effect is small.
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3. Application to Real Data
Up to now our illustrations of the methodology have been somewhat idealized. We
now apply the approach to a real-world data. We consider the valuation of credit default
swaps on Ashland Inc. at the close of trading on July 13, 2000. Ashland is a Fortune
500 company based in Kentucky with interests in chemicals, oil, car products, petroleum
refining and retailing, and coal. The company had about 80 unsecured bonds outstanding
on July 13, 2000. We did not have data on the volume of trading for the bonds and chose
to base our analysis on quotes for a sample of eight of the bonds that had a wide range of
maturities and relatively high issue sizes. Quotes for these bonds at the close of trading
on July 13, 2000 are shown in Table 5. All bonds in our sample are all rated BBB by
S&P and Baa2 by Moody’s. They contain no embedded options apart from a poison put.
Quotes for the benchmark Treasury bonds and Treasury bills at the close of trading on
July 13, 2000 are shown in Table 6.
We used a bootstrap procedure to calculate a Treasury zero curve from the data in
Table 6. We then estimated the default probabilities shown in Table 7 using the approach
in Section 1. This in turn enabled us to use the approach in Section 2 to calculate CDS
spreads for instruments with semiannual payments and a number of different maturities.
The reference obligation was assumed to have a coupon of 8% per annum paid semiannually.
From Table 1 we estimated the expected recovery rate to be 48.84%. Table 8 shows the
CDS spreads together with
(a) The spread between Treasury yields and Ashland yields; and
(b) The spread between Treasury yields and Ashland yields after the adjustment in equa-
tion (12) is applied
To calculate the spread in (a), we interpolated between quoted Treasury yields to
calculate Treasury yields for bonds with the same maturity as the Ashland bonds. This
enabled us to calculate a yield spread for each Ashland bond. We then interpolated between
these yield spreads to calculate yield spreads for the CDS maturities.
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To make the adjustment in (b), A∗(t) was estimated by bootstrapping a zero curve
for Ashland and using it to calculate par yields. This involved using the bootstrap method
to calculate a zero curve for Ashland and using this to calculate the par yields. There is
a very small approximation here because, as mentioned in Section 1, value additivity does
not apply to corporate bonds.
Table 8 shows that the approach in equation (12) works reasonably well. It provides
a significant improvement over the naive approach of setting the CDS spread equal to the
interpolated credit spread. The CDS spread estimate given by equation (12) is higher than
the true CDS spread for the 20-year maturity because the long end of the Treasury yield
curve is downward sloping.
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4. Conclusions
The valuation of a credit default swap is a two step procedure. First bonds issued by
the reference entity (or a company with the same risk of default as the reference entity)
must be used to estimate the risk-neutral probability of the reference entity defaulting at
different future times. The present value of the expected payments made by the buyer of
the swap and the present value of the expected payoff must then be calculated.
The valuation requires estimates of the amount claimed by bondholders in the event
of a default and the expected recovery rate. The most realistic assumption about the
amount claimed in the event of a default is that it equals the face value of the bond plus
accrued interest. The expected recovery rate must be estimated from empirical data. The
valuation of a vanilla CDS is relatively insensitive to the expected recovery rate, but this
is not so for a binary CDS.
A simple estimate of the T -year credit default swap spread is the yield on a T -year
bond issued by the reference entity minus the T -year Treasury par yield. A small adjust-
ment to the estimate, equation (12), should be made to reflect the way the payoffs on
credit default swaps are calculated. The estimate is then reasonably accurate in many
circumstances. However, there are errors when the Treasury zero curve is significantly
non-flat and when rates are very high.
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Table 1
Recovery Rates on Corporate Bonds
from Moody’s Investor’s Service (2000)
Class Mean (%) Standard
Deviation (%)
Senior Secured 52.31 25.15
Senior Unsecured 48.84 25.01
Senior Subordinated 39.46 24.59
Subordinated 33.17 20.78
Junior Subordinated 19.69 13.85
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Table 2
Hypothetical Example of Bonds Issued by Reference Entity∗
Bond Life Coupon Bond Yield
(years) (%) (Spread Over Treasury Par Yield in bps)
1 7.0 160
2 7.0 170
3 7.0 180
4 7.0 190
5 7.0 200
10 7.0 220
∗Bond coupon is paid semiannually and bond yield is expressed with semiannual com-
pounding. All Treasury rates are assumed to be 5% per annum with semiannual com-
pounding. Expected recovery rate = 30%.
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Table 3
Implied Probabilities of Default for Data in Table 2
Time Default Probability Density
(years) Claim = No-default Value Claim = Face Value + Accr. Int.
0–1 0.0220 0.0219
1–2 0.0245 0.0242
2–3 0.0269 0.0264
3–4 0.0292 0.0285
4–5 0.0315 0.0305
5–10 0.0295 0.0279
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Table 4
Cases Considered∗
Data Used CDS Spread CDS Spread
equation (9) equation (12)
Case A All Treasury rates are 5%; spreads 1.944 1.945
and coupons on corporate bonds are
as in Table 2; recovery rate is 30%
Case B 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-year Treasury 2.071 1.945
par yields are 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5%
respectively; spreads on corporate bonds
are as in Table 2; recovery rate is 30%
Case C All Treasury rates are 5%; spreads 1.990 1.945
on corporate bonds are as in Table 2;
coupons on corporate bonds are 4%;
recovery rate is 30%
Case D All Treasury rates are 5%; coupons 29.98 40.00
on corporate bonds are as in Table 2;
yields on 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-year
corporate bonds are 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%,
and 50%; recovery rate is 0%
∗ Coupons are paid semiannually and all rates and yields are expressed with semiannual
compounding.
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Table 5
Quotes for Unsecured Bonds Issued By Ashland Inc.
at Close of Trading on July 13, 2000
Maturity Coupon Quoted Quoted
Date % per annum Price Yield
Dec 15, 2000 9.48 100.672 7.715
Mar 1, 2001 9.30 100.689 8.150
Jan 27, 2003 8.40 100.234 8.295
Jul 21, 2004 7.91 98.899 8.237
Nov 14, 2006 6.90 93.066 8.332
Dec 27, 2011 8.88 103.067 8.455
Apr 1, 2015 8.38 98.433 8.569
Feb 21, 2025 8.63 100.105 8.619
Source: Bridge–Telerate Service in the Financial Research and Trading Lab, Joseph L.
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto.
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Table 6
Quotes for Benchmark Government Bills and Bonds
at Close of Trading on July 13, 2000
Maturity Coupon Quoted Quoted
Date % per annum Price Yield
Oct 12, 2000 Bill 5.990 6.171
Jan 11, 2001 Bill 5.990 6.267
May 31, 2001 Bill 5.740 6.055
Jun 30, 2002 6.375 100.141 6.296
May 15, 2005 6.750 102.516 6.140
Feb 15, 2010 6.500 103.563 6.005
May 15, 2030 6.250 106.094 5.817
Source: Bridge–Telerate Service in the Financial Research and Trading Lab, Joseph L.
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto.
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Table 7
Cumulative Risk-Neutral Default Probabilities for Ashland Inc.
Date Cumulative Default Probability
Dec 15, 2000 0.0124
Mar 1, 2001 0.0231
Jan 27, 2003 0.0929
Jul 21, 2004 0.1455
Nov 14, 2006 0.2472
Dec 27, 2011 0.4183
Apr 1, 2015 0.5563
Feb 21, 2025 0.7642
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Table 8
CDS Spreads for Ashland and Estimates Provided by the Yield Spread
Before and After Applying the Adjustment in Equation (12)
Maturity Yield Adjusted Yield Spread CDS Spread
(years) Spread Equation (12) Equation (9)
1 199 191 189
2 202 194 193
3 204 196 196
4 205 197 198
5 213 205 209
10 240 231 227
15 262 251 251
20 269 258 253
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Figure 1
Dependence of Five-Year Credit Default Swap Spread on the Expected Recovery Rate
When Reference Liability is a Five-Year 10% Coupon Bond
Case A: Data as in Table 2
Case B: Data as in Table 2 except that one-, two-, three-, four-, and five-year Treasury par
yields are 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, and 5%, respectively
Case C: Data as in Table 2 except that the coupons on all bonds are 4% instead of 7%
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Figure 2
Dependence of Five-Year Binary Credit Default Swap Spread
on the Expected Recovery Rate
Case A: Data as in Table 2
Case B: Data as in Table 2 except that one-, two-, three-, four-, and five-year Treasury par
yields are 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, respectively
Case C: Data as in Table 2 except that the coupons on all bonds are 4% instead of 7%
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